SLOBOGIN (DO NOT DELETE)

12/20/2012 2:32 AM

MAKING THE MOST OF UNITED
STATES V. JONES IN A
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: A
STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION OF
MOSAIC THEORY
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones, a
majority of the Justices appeared to recognize that under some
circumstances aggregation of information about an individual
through governmental surveillance can amount to a Fourth
Amendment search. If adopted by the Court, this notion—
sometimes called “mosaic theory”—could bring about a radical
change to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, not just in connection
with surveillance of public movements—the issue raised in Jones—
but also with respect to the government’s increasingly pervasive
record-mining efforts. One reason the Court might avoid the mosaic
theory is the perceived difficulty of implementing it. This article
provides, in the guise of a model statute, a means of doing so. More
specifically, this article explains how proportionality reasoning and
political process theory can provide concrete guidance for the courts
and police in connection with physical and data surveillance.
1

In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court took a giant step into
the modern age. Ignoring the insinuation of its own precedent, the
entire Court, albeit in three separate opinions, signaled that
technological tracking of a car can be a search under the Fourth
2
Amendment. Even more importantly, all three opinions in Jones

Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. The author would
like to thank participants in workshops at Vanderbilt Law School and at the Privacy Law
Scholars’ Conference, June 8, 2012, for their feedback on drafts of this article.
1. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 31–38.
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made statements that call into question the Court’s “third party
doctrine,” the controversial notion that government officials need no
justification under the Constitution to view or access any activities or
information that can be viewed or accessed by third parties outside
3
the home.
The decision in Jones is long overdue. Federal, state, and local
governments are rapidly taking advantage of advances in technology
to keep tabs on their citizenry, in increasingly intrusive ways. Millions
of times each year, the police track individuals using technology
attached to cars, as in Jones, or signals from either phones or factory4
installed transponders. Thousands of cameras, many with zoom,
tracking, and facial recognition capacity, continuously scan hundreds
5
of urban and suburban areas. Equipped with powerful magnification
devices, hundreds of drones will soon be flying over a number of
6
jurisdictions. The capacity of computers to access, store, and analyze
data has made mountains of personal information—ranging from
phone and e-mail logs to credit card and bank transactions—available
7
to government officials at virtually the touch of a button. Before
Jones, the third party doctrine ensured that none of this activity was
8
regulated by the Fourth Amendment.

3. Id. For one of the more recent, among dozens of, criticisms of the third party doctrine,
see generally Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Third Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein
and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009).
4. See, e.g., Justin Elliott, Police Tapped Sprint Customer GPS Data 8 Million Times in a
Year, TPMMUCKRAKER (Dec. 4, 2009, 6:03 PM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/
2009/12/ revelation_8_million_gps_searches_on_sprint_by_law.php.
5. See, e.g., Mark Rockwell, ACLU Calls for Ban on New Chicago Surveillance Cameras,
SECURITY
NEWS
(Feb.
8,
2011,
12:12
PM),
GOVERNMENT
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/22394 (reporting the presence of over 1,500 cameras in
Chicago with zoom, tracking, and facial-recognition capacity); Allison Klein, Police Go Live
POST
(Feb.
11,
2008),
Monitoring
D.C.
Crime
Cameras,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/10/AR2008021002726_pf.html
(reporting seventy-three cameras in use, with fifty more planned, in Washington, D.C. and
camera systems in Baltimore, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia).
6. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DRONES IN
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf
(reporting that the FAA predicts that over 30,000 drones will be flying over domestic airspace
within the next twenty years, equippable with “high-powered cameras, thermal imaging devices,
license-plate readers, and laser radar (LADAR)” (footnotes omitted)).
7. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 317, 318–21 (2008) (describing the expansion of federal, state, and private data
mining initiatives despite the end of the Terrorism Information Awareness program in 2003).
8. For a description of some of the cases adopting the third party doctrine, see infra text
accompanying notes 27–30.
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Strictly speaking, even after Jones most of these investigative
techniques remain unregulated as a constitutional matter. The precise
holding of Jones, per Justice Scalia, was that when police officers
attach a tracking device to a car, they are engaging in a trespass on an
“effect” that is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s declaration that
“people shall be secure in their houses, persons, papers and effects
9
from unreasonable searches and seizures.” While the majority went
on to conclude that subsequent use of that device to track movements
10
of the car constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, the key to the
decision is the predicate trespass. None of the investigative actions
described above, except for the type of tracking involved in Jones
itself, involve a physical interference with property, which is the usual
11
definition of trespass.
The majority did clearly hold, however, that if a trespass occurs,
the fact that third parties can observe the vehicle is irrelevant; a
12
search has occurred. Moreover, five Justices in Jones—Justice
Sotomayor in a solo concurring opinion and Justice Alito, joined by
three others—were willing to go further. Justice Sotomayor wrote
that, although unnecessary to decide the precise question at issue in
Jones, the Court would eventually need to recognize the ease with
which technology enables the government to acquire personal
information, chill expressive and associational freedoms, and abuse its
power, and she strongly suggested that tracking even in the absence of
13
trespass infringes reasonable expectations of privacy. Justice Alito
similarly opined that “society’s expectation has been that law
enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main,
simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single
14
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” In short,
both concurring opinions endorsed what the lower court in Jones
called the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment—the idea that
certain types of governmental investigation enable accumulation of so
many individual bits about a person’s life that the resulting
9. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
10. Id.
11. See infra note 62.
12. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. The majority also made the intriguing statement that “no case”
supports the proposition that a government action that would otherwise be a search is not a
search if it “produces only public information.” Id. at 952.
13. Id. at 956–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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15

personality picture is worthy of constitutional protection.
The opinions in Jones thus open the door to a more expansive
Fourth Amendment. But the Court still has much to work out. At
16
present, the mosaic theory is little more than a name.
Taking a different tack than the voluminous literature that has
17
grappled with this issue both before and after Jones, this article
proffers a statute that attempts to operationalize mosaic theory,
relying on two more basic concepts that I have explored in other
work. The first concept is the proportionality principle, the idea that
the justification for a search should be roughly proportional to the
intrusiveness of the search. The second is John Hart Ely’s political
18
process theory. As applied to searches, this theory counsels that
courts should generally defer to legislation authorizing searches of
groups when the affected groups have meaningful access to the
legislative process and the search is implemented in an even-handed
19
fashion.
Of course, numerous other theories of the Fourth Amendment
exist and might apply in this context. Some of them are described and
compared in the following discussion. In part, this article is an effort
to persuade that these other theories do not work as well.
The primary goal of this article, however, is to provide a
springboard for a much-needed codification of search-related
doctrine. Among Western countries, the United States stands out in its
failure to provide clear statutory statements of the law governing

15. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (2010) (“As with the ‘mosaic theory’ often
invoked by the Government in cases involving national security information, ‘What may seem
trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the
scene.’” (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985))), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
16. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2032821 (criticizing “mosaic
theory”).
17. One of the earliest purveyors of mosaic theory (although without using the label) was
Richard H. McAdams, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth
Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 318 (1985) (“[W]hen courts consider . . . [F]ourth
[A]mendment rights, they should focus on both the aggregate of individual police encounters
and the synergistic effects of pervasive police practice on society as a whole.”). One of the latest
analyses of the theory is found in Kerr, supra note 16 (manuscript at 1–3) (arguing that mosaic
theory cannot be coherently implemented).
18. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) (exploring political process theory).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 79–85.
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20

police investigation. Codification might be particularly useful in the
surveillance setting. In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito stated,
“[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best
21
solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.” He continued, “[a]
legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to
draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a
22
comprehensive way.” The statute proposed in this article provides an
example of the kinds of nuances that must be resolved in order to
work through the Fourth Amendment’s application to governmental
surveillance. At the same time, in many respects the statute goes
beyond anything the Fourth Amendment requires, in either scope or
detail. As such, it is truly legislative in import, not simply a summary
of possible judicially created minimum requirements under the
Fourth Amendment.
After describing more fully the questions left open by Jones and
how that case intersects with various Fourth Amendment theories,
this article sets out the proposed statute. The statute begins with
definitions of terms like “search,” “probable cause,” and “exigent
circumstances” and then proceeds to substantive regulation of
“targeted” searches, relying on proportionality theory, and of
“general” searches, relying on political process theory. Each provision
is followed by a brief commentary. A number of other issues—most
importantly regarding the use of information gathered through
surveillance and sanctions for violations of the rules—are not
addressed in the statute, but a few comments about these topics
appear at the end of the article. Only by making explicit in this way
the consequences of theory can theory be adequately evaluated.
II. QUESTIONS AFTER JONES
The story of the Supreme Court’s conservative take on the
definition of the word “search” in the Fourth Amendment is wellknown. After years of defining this threshold question in property
23
terms, the Court reoriented search analysis toward a test focusing on
20. Cf. Craig M. Bradley, Overview, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY
xv, xix (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999) (“[W]ith the exception of the United States, all of the
countries presented in the book, and most other countries, have a nationally applicable code of
criminal procedure rather than relying on judicial precedents as the means of governing the
criminal process.”).
21. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding that use of a
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24

reasonable expectations of privacy. On its face, that test appears to
be broader than a property-based approach, as evidenced by the
25
decision in the seminal case of Katz v. United States, which
established privacy protection as the focus of Fourth Amendment
protection. In that case, the Court held that electronic interception of
a phone conversation taking place in a phone booth was a search
despite the uncontroverted facts that the defendant did not own the
booth, the bugging device would not have physically trespassed on it
even if he had owned it, and the conversation intercepted was not an
26
“effect.”
In the hands of the post-Warren Court, however, Katz has pretty
much been limited to its facts in situations not involving a physical
intrusion into a house, person, paper, or effect. The Fourth
Amendment remains tied to property concepts, largely because the
post-Warren Court has subscribed to the notion that, when a trespass
is not involved, the police are entitled to view or access anything a
third party can view or access. Thus, Katz did not prevent the Court
from holding that no search occurs when police observe, from
27
navigable airspace, the fenced-in curtilage of the home; after all, the
Court reasoned, members of the public in a plane or on a double28
decker bus could have seen the same thing the police did. Similar
reasoning led the Court to decide that people assume the risk that
when information is handed over to third parties—including
institutional third parties such as banks and phone companies—they
29
cannot reasonably expect the information to remain private. In

“spike mike” that intruded into a wall was a trespass and therefore a search); Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1942) (holding that use of a detectaphone that touched the
outer wall of suspect’s office was not a trespass and therefore not a search); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464 (1928) (holding that tapping of telephone wires outside suspects’
premises was not a trespass and therefore not a search).
24. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 120–21 (5th ed. 2008) (describing post-Katz
developments).
25. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. See id. at 353 (“We conclude that . . . the ‘trespass’ doctrine . . . can no longer be
regarded as controlling. . . . The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did
not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”).
27. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986).
28. See id. at 211 (“[A] 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a
citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus.”).
29. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that a person who “voluntarily
convey[s] numerical information to the telephone company . . . assume[s] the risk that the
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed”); Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435,
443 (1976) (holding that government access to bank records is not a search because an
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short, the third party doctrine has pervaded analysis of the search
30
issue.
The Jones majority departed from this line of cases, but only
minimally so. The month-long tracking that occurred in Jones involved
observation of public activity that could have been viewed by anyone
and thus, under the third party doctrine, should have been exempted
from Fourth Amendment restrictions. The Court held to the contrary,
but only because the observation was facilitated by a physical
31
trespass. That reasoning comports with the property orientation of
previous cases. In fact, Justice Scalia’s opinion avoided the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test entirely. While he did not
32
repudiate that test, he reasoned that, given the Fourth Amendment’s
reference to persons, houses, papers, and effects, the Amendment also
33
explicitly protects property interests. Thus, on the facts of Jones, the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test was not needed to resolve the
case.
In contrast, the five concurring Justices signaled a readiness to
abandon the link between physical intrusion and the Fourth
Amendment and hold that, even when a trespass is not involved,
public surveillance using technology can be a search, at least when it
is prolonged. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan, contended that the majority’s approach was too beholden to
outmoded property concepts and insisted that the only question that

individual “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the Government,” even where the information is “revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party will not be betrayed”).
30. The Court has actually developed three doctrines that implement the third party idea.
The knowing exposure doctrine asks whether the activity observed by police was knowingly
exposed to the public, and has bolstered decisions allowing tracking of cars and flyovers of open
fields and curtilage. The general public use doctrine determines whether police, standing on a
lawful vantage point, rely on technology that is generally available to the public; this doctrine
might leave unregulated the use of binoculars to look inside a house. The assumption of risk
doctrine posits that no search occurs when the government obtains information about a target
from a third party that the target knows or should know has the information. See Christopher
Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age? in CONSTITUTION 3.0:
FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 11, 14–19 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes, eds.,
2011).
31. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“We hold that the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the
vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”).
32. See id. at 952 (“The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” (emphasis added)).
33. Id.

SLOBOGIN (DO NOT DELETE)

8

12/20/2012 2:32 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SPECIAL ISSUE

[VOL. 8

should be asked is “whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular
case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would
34
not have anticipated.” Under this approach, Justice Alito continued,
“relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public
streets” is not a search, but “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in
35
investigations of most offenses” could be. This language echoed that
used by the lower court, which had held for Jones on the ground that
“[w]hen it comes to privacy . . . the whole may be more revealing than
36
the parts.”
Justice Sotomayor’s position was, on the surface, similar to Justice
Alito’s and the lower court’s. She thought the question should be
“whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs,
37
sexual habits, and so on.” Going well beyond Justice Alito’s concerns,
however, she also stated that “it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” an approach she
considered “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
38
carrying out mundane tasks.”
Thus, after Jones five Justices are positioned to declare that longterm tracking is a search in the absence of a trespass, and the other
four Justices have not definitively rejected that idea. However, several
other questions remain open:
1. Will Justice Alito’s distinction between long-term and
short-term surveillance end up defining when a search
occurs in public spaces, and if so, what is the difference
between the two? In other words, how should mosaic
theory play out? Justice Alito was unwilling to draw any
robust conclusions on this score, other than to say that the
39
four weeks involved in Jones “surely crossed” the line.

34. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
37. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 957.
39. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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2. If tracking is a search, does it always require probable
cause? Although probable cause is usually required for a
40
Fourth Amendment search, neither the majority nor the
concurring Justices in Jones flatly stated that the
41
traditional rule applies to tracking.
3. Assuming that probable cause or some other justification
is usually required for technological tracking, at least if it is
long-term, is that requirement relaxed or inapplicable in
connection with investigation of “some offenses” (or
“extraordinary offenses,” the term Justice Alito used later
42
in his opinion)? If so, what offenses?
4. Reaching more broadly, does Jones’s treatment of tracking
cases have implications for other situations that are
encompassed by the third party doctrine, as Justice
Sotomayor suggested? For instance, what if long-term
tracking does not use technology? What if the government
decides to access recorded data about a person that is
possessed by a third party?
The statute proposed in this article will suggest answers to these
questions. Before engaging in that relatively precise endeavor,
however, it is necessary to flesh out some theoretical possibilities.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT THEORY
Since Katz, the Supreme Court’s focal point in determining
whether a police action is a Fourth Amendment search has been
privacy. Yet from its inception the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been attacked as unduly manipulable. In his dissent in Katz,
Justice Black complained that “by arbitrarily substituting the Court’s
language, designed to protect privacy, for the Constitution’s language,
designed to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding all
laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court’s broadest

40. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (“Ordinarily, a search—even one
that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant—must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to
believe that a violation has occurred.”).
41. 132 S. Ct. at 954 (explaining that the Court had “no occasion to consider” the
government’s argument that something less than a warrant based on probable cause would have
justified the search in Jones); id. at 964 n.11 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the question of
what restrictions the Fourth Amendment imposes on tracking “is not before us”).
42. Id. at 964.
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43

concept of privacy.” While Justice Black did not agree with the
defendant-oriented holding in Katz, he also presciently noted that the
44
privacy concept could be abused in the government’s favor as well.
Partly because they believe that the latter prediction has come to pass,
many academic commentators have taken potshots at the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test and proposed substitutes, including
45
46
47
48
formulations focused on property, coercion, mutual trust, liberty,
49
50
51
dignity, security, and power.
There is no doubt that privacy is protean, given the whimsicality of
public attitudes about disclosing personal facts and the increasing role
52
technology plays in facilitating that disclosure. Furthermore, as
Justice Scalia has noted, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test is
“circular,” in the sense that expectations of privacy are reasonable
53
only when the Court says they are. I have argued that these

43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 374 (“The history of governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to
repose such powers [provided by linking the Fourth Amendment to the “privacy” concept] in
courts.”).
45. See Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court Dismantled the
Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 72 (2005) (arguing for a Fourth Amendment
“rooted in property theories”).
46. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1020 (1995) (“Were the law of criminal procedure to focus more on force and
coercion and less on information gathering . . . it would square better with other constitutional
law and better protect the interests most people value most highly.”).
47. See Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1758–63 (1994) (“[T]he animating
principle which has been ignored in the current Fourth Amendment debate is the idea of
reciprocal government-citizen trust.”).
48. Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment after Lawrence,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (“Lawrence’s emphasis on liberty provides a fruitful way of
reorienting Fourth Amendment protections when considering particular kinds of interpersonal
relationships.” (referencing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003))).
49. See John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L.
REV. 655, 661 (“[T]he concept of dignity captures a core Fourth Amendment value that privacy
does not, and therefore must be explicitly incorporated into reasonableness analysis.”).
50. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy or
Security? 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 307–08 (1998) (“Only by understanding the meaning of
the term ‘secure’ is it possible to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections
for individuals and, correlatively, the amount of unregulated governmental power the
amendment allows.”).
51. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) (“The Fourth
Amendment protects power not privacy.”).
52. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 47, at 1758–63 (“The very notion of a right to be left alone
seems a bit tattered once placed in the context of contemporary life.”).
53. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (observing that the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test “has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and
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objections can be partially overcome by tying privacy to positive law
(including the law of property) and to empirical work on society’s
54
views. But it must be admitted that privacy is a very elastic concept.
Most of the other tests fare no better, however. Terms like
“liberty,” “dignity,” “power,” “coercion,” “trust,” and “security” are
hardly self-defining. And most of them do not help advance the ball.
The entire Bill of Rights, from the First Amendment’s guarantees of
speech and association through the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment, is meant to protect liberty and
dignity against governmental abuse of power. The issue in Fourth
Amendment cases is the precise aspects of dignity, liberty, and power
55
that are implicated by searches and seizures. Protection against
physical coercion cannot be the answer if we want covert surveillance
56
to be regulated. And maximizing citizen trust of government or the
security of citizens from its officials, while certainly reasons to require
justification for searches, does not tell us when something is a search
57
or what justification is required if it is a search.
That leaves property as a possible alternative touchstone for the
Fourth Amendment, a notion that has taken on new life since Justice
Scalia explicitly rejuvenated it in Jones. Several commentators have
argued that property law provides a more concrete reference point
58
for Fourth Amendment analysis than privacy does. But property
unpredictable”).
54. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 32–35 (2007).
55. Thus Professor Ku, who argues that power is the linchpin of Fourth Amendment
analysis, nonetheless circles back to privacy in defining why power is relevant. See Ku, supra
note 51, at 1326 (“[T]he amendment is best understood as a means of preserving the people’s
authority over government—the people’s sovereign right to determine how and when
government may intrude into the lives and influence the behavior of its citizens.”). Most critics
of Katz seem more bothered by the way the Court defines privacy than by privacy’s mismatch
with the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Castiglione, supra note 49, at 660 (“As courts’ decisions
have moved towards an almost exclusive focus on privacy as the counterbalance to the
government’s law-enforcement interest, the government’s interests have increasingly prevailed
and the sphere of protection afforded to the individual has shrunk.” (footnote omitted)).
56. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 26 (noting that covert surveillance does not involve
coercion).
57. Id. at 25 (discussing why the trust model, and by implication models focused solely on
security, do not provide help in figuring out the justification required by the Fourth
Amendment in particular situations).
58. For a post-Jones example of this stance, see Erica Goldberg, Commentary, How
United States v. Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 68 (2012) (concluding that Jones’s “resurrection of the link between
searches and property . . . is a substantial step toward” making the Fourth Amendment “more
concrete”).
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notions are also manipulable and changeable, and thus their content
for Fourth Amendment purposes will, as with expectations of privacy,
be entirely dependent on what the Court says. For instance, the Court
has held that private property in the “open fields” is not part of the
59
house protected by the Fourth Amendment, that garbage left at
60
curbside is abandoned, and, prior to Katz, that bugging a phone line
61
outside of a house is not a trespass.
For those who want to expand the scope of the Fourth
Amendment to cover technological surveillance, property is a
particularly shaky basis for reform. Justice Scalia’s statement in Jones
that planting a GPS device on a car is a trespass has been castigated
as inconsistent with both the historical and the modern understanding
of trespasses on chattel, which usually requires significant physical
62
interference with property. Scholars attempting to bring other types
of surveillance under the property rubric have had to resort to even
more exotic arguments. Interception of phone or computer
communications, and tracking using the signals from cell phones, are
said to be “trespasses” on the electronic particles sent by these
63
devices. Aerial surveillance purportedly violates the common law
doctrine of ad coelum, which grants property rights directly above
one’s home (but, unfortunately for those who would like to regulate
64
satellite and drone surveillance, nowhere else). And perhaps most

59. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (“[O]nly the curtilage, not
the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the
home.”).
60. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (“[H]aving deposited
their garbage ‘in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking,
public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it,’ respondents could have
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.” (quoting
United States v. Reicherter , 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981))).
61. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464 (1928) (“The insertions were
made without trespass upon any property of the defendants. . . . The evidence was secured by
the use of the sense of hearing and that only.”).
62. See, e.g., Peter A. Winn, Trespass and the Fourth Amendment: Some Reflections on
Jones, USVJONES.COM (June 4, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/trespass-and-the-fourthamendment-some-reflections-on-jones/ (noting that, according to Blackstone, trespass to
chattels required that the chattel “had been misappropriated or destroyed,” which clearly did
not occur in Jones, and noting further that Justice Alito misquoted the relevant eighteenthcentury treatise, which is actually hostile to the notion of a cause of action arising from trespass
to chattels).
63. See Goldberg, supra note 58, at 68 (“Even in the Katz electronic surveillance case, the
Court could have retained the connection between property rights and privacy rights by holding
that an electronic connection to an individual’s property (or to the phone company’s property)
is a physical intrusion, albeit on a microscopic level.”).
64. Lance Polivy, Property Expanding Fourth Amendment Protections: The Common Law
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creative of all is the assertion that people have a property interest in
65
records created and maintained by third parties.
I am sympathetic with the outcomes of these arguments. But they
have a legal fiction quality to them that is as tenuous as any argument
based on privacy. Furthermore, any realistic property-based Fourth
Amendment is likely to leave intact the most egregious aspect of the
third party doctrine: its immunization of governmental acquisition of
66
personal information held by third parties. I have contended that,
with all of its flaws, privacy—defined loosely as the ability to avoid
intrusion into one’s affairs—remains the best basis for analyzing
67
Fourth Amendment issues. On this assumption, I have taken the
position that any government effort to observe or find out about a
person’s activities, transactions, or communications is a Fourth
68
Amendment search. While this position is admittedly a significant
departure from the Court’s approach, it conforms to the lay use of the
69
word “search,” which, as Justice Scalia noted in Kyllo v. United States,
means “[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding
70
something; to explore; to examine by inspection.”
As Justice Scalia goes on to suggest in his Kyllo majority opinion,
the Court’s unwillingness to define search according to its plain
meaning may be the result of a desire “to preserve somewhat more
intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively
71
unconstitutional.” In other words, because Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence usually requires a warrant based on probable cause for
any action denominated a search, the Justices are loath to apply the
search label to police actions—like looking into a house from the

Doctrine of Ad Coelum and Drone Searches after Jones, USVJONES.COM (June 3, 2012),
http://usvjones.com/2012/06/03/property-expanding-fourth-amendment-protections-thecommon-law-doctrine-of-ad-coelum-and-drone-searches-after-jones.
65. That is not to say an argument cannot be made in some contexts. See, e.g., Jerry L.
Mashaw, “Rights” in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1137 (1983) (“The
Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act gave all citizens ‘property rights’ in the
information held by government bureaus.” (footnotes omitted)).
66. See Winn, supra note 62 (“[T]he law of trespass, if it requires anything, requires a
possessory interest; and the powerful intuitions of invasion of privacy today are triggered by the
massive amounts of detailed personal information residing in the servers of third parties.”).
67. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 23–24 (explaining “why privacy is a core value
protected by the Fourth Amendment”).
68. See id. (arguing that the word “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes ought to be
congruent with the lay definition of the term).
69. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
70. Id. at 32 n.1.
71. Id. at 32.
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public sidewalk—that are often reasonable attempts to develop
probable cause. Even liberal Justices have had a hard time ignoring
72
this reality.
Another approach—again suggested by Justice Scalia in Kyllo—
would be to adopt a broad definition of search, as described above,
but to declare that certain searches are reasonable even when not
73
based on probable cause. For some time I have been advancing an
analogous approach, which I have called the proportionality
74
principle. Simply put, the proportionality principle requires that the
justification for a search be roughly proportional to its intrusiveness.
The Court has always used this proportionality reasoning in dealing
75
with seizures, and on more than a few occasions the Court appears
76
to have applied it to searches. In Jones itself, Justice Alito’s
distinction between “prolonged” and short-term tracking could be
seen as an application of the proportionality idea. The suggestion here
is that this principle—although not necessarily the Court’s application
of it—should be adopted as the means of determining the
“reasonableness” of all searches.
However, I have also suggested two exceptions to the
proportionality principle. First, the justification normally required by
that principle should be relaxed when the search is designed to deal
77
with a significant, imminent, and specific threat. The law, including

72. For instance, both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined United States v. Knotts,
holding that short-term tracking with a beeper is not a search, and only Justice Marshall was
“adamant” about requiring a warrant in Miller and Smith, the bank record and phone record
cases. SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 208.
73. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30–32.
74. The first article advocating this position was Christopher Slobogin, The World Without
a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 68–75 (1991).
75. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697–98 (1981) (noting that in seizure
cases that did not require probable cause, the Court has held that “the intrusion on the citizen’s
privacy ‘was so much less severe’ than that involved in a traditional arrest that ‘the opposing
interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer’s safety’ could support the
seizure as reasonable” (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979)).
76. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (stating that reasonable
suspicion is sufficient to justify search of an employee’s desk in part because “the employer
intrusions at issue here ‘involve a relatively limited invasion’ of employee privacy” (quoting
Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search
for weapons for the protection of the police officer, . . . regardless of whether he has probable
cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”).
77. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 26–28 (“Prevention of imminent harm is clearly a
legitimate government objective. In the post-9/11 era, the danger rationale for reducing the
government’s burden is particularly attractive.”).
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Fourth Amendment law, routinely relaxes restrictions on the
78
government when its aim is to prevent serious harm.
The second exception arises when the government wants to search
large groups of predominately law-abiding people, as occurs in
connection with drug testing programs, citywide camera systems, or a
nationwide data-mining regime. Under today’s jurisprudence, many of
these programs (for instance, camera surveillance of public streets and
mining information held by third parties) would not be considered
79
searches at all. When they are said to be searches (as with drug
testing), the Supreme Court’s approach has been to apply its “special
needs” analysis, which has generally meant that so long as the
government can demonstrate the group search meets a significant
governmental need that is distinct from a general interest in crime
80
control, it is permissible despite the lack of individualized suspicion.
Academics have generally disagreed with the Court’s holdings but
have usually resorted to similar analysis in such cases by requiring the
government to show that the search program addresses a particularly
81
significant regulatory problem in the least intrusive manner possible.
I am not as confident that courts are equipped to measure the
necessity for a group search or the usefulness and feasibility of its
82
alternatives. In any event, I have suggested that application of John
Hart Ely’s political process theory should be considered in this
78. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (permitting commitment on
clear and convincing evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt partly because the
state should not be saddled with a standard of proof that “may completely undercut” its
preventive efforts); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (justifying frisks based on reasonable suspicion
in part because of the need to protect the police).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 27–30.
80. Compare Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (holding that suspicionless
drug testing of students in extracurricular activities was permissible “[g]iven the nationwide
epidemic of drug use, and the evidence of increased drug use in Tecumseh schools”), with City
of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000) (holding that suspicionless stops at
roadblocks set up to interdict drugs were unconstitutional because “the primary purpose of
the . . . program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing”).
81. See, e.g., Thomas Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 MEMPHIS L. REV. 483, 618 (1995) (arguing that
group searches ought to be analyzed by looking at “the absence of effective alternatives, the
comparative productivity of operating without individualized suspicion, the need to achieve a
high level of enforcement, and the inability to identify the source of the problem utilizing
individualized suspicion”); see also Scott Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics:
Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 430–36 (1988) (arguing for
application of a “compelling government interest-least intrusive means test” for “initiatory
searches” for which there is no pre-existing suspicion).
82. See Slobogin, supra note 30, at 28–29 (providing examples of why judicial analysis of
the feasibility and efficacy of differing law enforcements will be very difficult).
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83

context. Ely argued that, when interpreting vague constitutional
provisions such as the Due Process Clause, courts should grant
deference to legislative pronouncements—in other words, engage
only in rationality review—if the affected groups had meaningful
access to the legislative process and the statute is framed and applied
84
even-handedly. Applying this analysis in the Fourth Amendment
context, a statute authorizing a group search might be presumptively
valid. However, a group search program initiated solely by the
executive branch is not entitled to judicial deference. Furthermore,
even when authorized by legislation, such programs are vulnerable
under political process theory if the affected group lacked
representation in the decision-making body. Although the latter
85
inquiry can be complex, in the search context it can be
operationalized in part by assuring that members of the decisionmaking body are subject to the program.
This discussion of Fourth Amendment theory has been an
86
extremely brief summary of longer treatments. These more detailed
works explain why the proportionality principle, the danger exception
to that principle, and political process theory are consistent with the
fundamental values underlying the Fourth Amendment and why the
restrictions they impose on investigative techniques that the Court
has seen fit to leave unregulated are important. Enough has been said
here, however, to set up the next section of this article, which presents
a statute designed to implement these three concepts.
IV. A PROPOSED STATUTE
The following statute is divided into two parts: a definition section
and a section setting forth substantive rules governing the conduct of
searches. To a large extent, it is meant to provide one possible
implementation of the concurring opinions in Jones. It rejects the
83. Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 130–
38 (2010).
84. ELY, supra note 18, at 102.
85. See Slobogin, supra note 83, at 132–36 (discussing public choice issues). It is also
possible that a group search program permissible under political process theory could still be
struck down on First Amendment grounds. Cf. Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth
Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 375 (2010) (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment,
read through a First Amendment prism, might require nullification of laws that chill collective
activity like association and speech, despite the third party doctrine).
86. A longer summary is found in Slobogin, supra note 30, at 23–31. For more on the
proportionality principle, see SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 23–47. For more on the application of
political process theory to the Fourth Amendment, see Slobogin, supra note 83, at 130–38.
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Court’s third party doctrine and accepts the “mosaic” notion that
accumulation of publicly available information or information in the
hands of third parties can be a search.
However, the statute also goes well beyond the innuendo in the
concurring opinions in Jones. It regulates not only physical
surveillance (for instance, tracking and camera surveillance) but also
transaction surveillance (for instance, accessing digitized information).
It also makes an important distinction between targeted searches and
general searches, with the former regulated under proportionality
theory and the latter regulated under political process theory. As a
result, in some places (for instance, the definition of “search” or the
regulation of non-technological searches) the statute provides more
protection than even a broad interpretation of the Jones opinions
would contemplate; in others (for instance, the regulation of general
searches) it may provide more or less protection than the Fourth
Amendment does, depending on the context and how the Court’s
precedents are interpreted. Each provision is followed by a short
commentary explaining the black letter language and tying the
provision to previous discussion.
REGULATION OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES
PART I: Definitions
(1) Search: An effort by government to find or discern evidence of
unlawful conduct. A targeted search seeks to obtain
information about a specific person or circumscribed place. A
general search seeks to obtain information about people or
places that are not targets at the time of the search.
Commentary: The definition in this provision is broader than the
Supreme Court’s definition of search for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Rather than focusing on reasonable expectations of privacy
and trespass, it straightforwardly defines search the way a layperson
would and consistently with the plain meaning of the Fourth
87
Amendment. It rejects the implications of the third party doctrine.

87. As such, this definition is very similar to a suggestion made by Daniel Solove. See
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (2010) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment should provide protection whenever a problem of reasonable significance
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Crucial to note is that the definition does not differentiate
between searches using technology and searches with the naked eye.
The officer who watches an individual walking down the street to see
what transpires is conducting a search under this definition whether
she does so with her unaided vision, binoculars, closed-circuit
television, or a drone. The officer who peruses records is engaged in a
search whether he does so manually or with a computer. Thus, this
provision avoids tying the definition of search to problematic
assessments of the search method used—such as whether it is general
public use, enhances the normal capacity of the police, or is unusually
88
pervasive or disruptive—that have bedeviled the courts. It also
avoids tying the definition of search to whether and to what extent a
physical intrusion is involved, whether the target has taken sufficient
steps to enhance privacy, or whether the item or information sought is
“intimate” as opposed to impersonal—all imponderable factors the
courts have nonetheless felt compelled to consider under the
89
Supreme Court’s test.
The subcategories of search defined in this provision are necessary
for the purposes indicated in Part II, which treats targeted searches
differently than general searches. Note that targets can be not only
people but places. While targeted searches will usually be directed at a
suspect, in some cases the target may be a place associated with
criminal activity rather than a person; if so, however, this definition
requires that the place be “circumscribed” (small and limited) to
distinguish it from a general search. Note further that if information is
sought from third parties about a specific person or place, it is a
targeted search. If, on the other hand, the government is trying to
solve, prevent, or deter as-yet undetected or perpetrated crime
through surveillance of the general population or a subset of it, it is
carrying out a general search.
(2) Data Search: A search, in the absence of explicit consent, of
digital, paper, audio, or other information sources and records
that is not governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Title III).

can be identified with a particular form of government information gathering.”).
88. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 394–98
(1997) (discussing factors courts consider in determining whether a particular type of
surveillance constitutes a search).
89. Id. at 392–94.
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Commentary: This definition encompasses accessing—through
technological or non-technological means—phone and e-mail logs,
bank records, credit card records, and any other records, but not
interception of the content of phone or computer communications.
The latter type of search generally requires a special warrant and is
governed by Title III.
(3) Public search: A search of a place, in the absence of explicit
consent, focused on activities or persons, limited to what the
natural senses of a person on a lawful public vantage point
could discern at the time of the search.
Commentary: This definition encompasses surveillance—whether
unaided or relying on technology such as closed-circuit television,
drones, and tracking and magnification devices—of curtilage and
home interiors as well as of public places, provided that the
surveillance discerns only what the natural senses could have
discerned from a lawful vantage point. Thus, a naked-eye or
technologically-enhanced search of a home interior by an officer
standing on the curtilage would not be a public search. Nor would a
technologically-enhanced search of a home interior, curtilage, or a
public place be a public search—even if it took place from a lawful
vantage point—if it observed activity that could not have been seen
90
by the naked eye from a legitimate position at the time of the search.
Most obviously, a search would not be public if it involves using
technology that can detect items underneath clothing or through
91
opaque surfaces of cars and buildings.
In all of these situations, the provisions on public searches detailed
in Part II do not apply. Generally, a warrant based on probable cause
would be required, although there may be exceptions. In United States
92
v. Place, the Court held that a dog-alert to the presence of
contraband is not a search because it is “much less intrusive” than a
90. This notion could raise some difficult issues. Cf. SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 64
(stating that if the police did not resort to naked-eye viewing because they feared discovery,
thus leading the targets to stop what they were doing or to hide it better, “the interior details
arguably could not have been seen with the naked eye”).
91. See Richard S. Julie, High-Tech Surveillance Tools and the Fourth Amendment:
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Technological Age, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 139–40
(2000) (describing concealed weapon detectors’ capability generally and, more specifically, a
device from Millivision that detects silhouettes against radiation waves emitted by the body to
detect items underneath clothing).
92. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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93

typical search, and involves only the disclosure of an item in which, a
94
later case explained, there is “no legitimate privacy interest.” Under
the definition of “search” in these provisions, the dog sniff in Place
would be a search, but might be considered reasonable given the
95
lesser infringement on privacy.
(4) Probable cause: An articulable belief that a search will more
likely than not produce contraband, fruit of crime, or other
significant evidence of wrongdoing. The belief may be based
on statistical analysis. Judicial authorization for a search based
on probable cause is called a warrant and must describe with
particularity the person or place targeted, the evidence sought,
and, if applicable, the duration of the search. A warrant is
valid for 30 days, at which point a new showing of probable
cause must be made.
Commentary: The Supreme Court’s definition of probable cause is
extremely vague. An oft-quoted passage from the Court states that
probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within [the
officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief” that evidence of crime will be
96
found. In the case in which this language appeared, the evidence was
97
contraband. In dictum in another case, the Court stated that
probable cause would exist even if the items sought are simply “useful
98
as evidence of a crime.”
The definition in this provision is more precise, and perhaps more
demanding, in two ways. First, it adopts the preponderance standard,
99
which is likely the way most judges think about probable cause.

93. Id. at 707 (concluding, in dictum, that a dog sniff of luggage is not a search).
94. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984).
95. The Court will be addressing this issue in more detail in Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564
(U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2012), to be decided in the 2012–13 Term. The Florida Supreme Court in
Jardines held that a dog sniff of a home conducted from the front door of the residence is a
Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla.
2011). Jones suggests that a key inquiry will be whether the presence of the dog is a trespass on
curtilage or instead can be viewed as justified through “consent” implied by the presence of a
sidewalk to the front door and other indicia of welcome.
96. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
97. Specifically, the item seized was “intoxicating liquor” being transported during the
Prohibition era. Id.
98. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
99. See Max Minzer, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913,
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Second, the definition also requires that the search seek significant
evidence of wrongdoing, such as contraband, stolen property, or direct
visual or written proof of crime, rather than mere circumstantial proof
of a prohibited harm. Thus, under this definition, even a
demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that a search will
100
prove gang membership would not constitute probable cause, nor
would a more-likely-than-not showing that a search will reveal that
the target frequents a particular place or knows certain people.
Conversely, a demonstration by a preponderance that a search will
allow observation of criminal conduct or produce illegal drugs or a
murder weapon would constitute probable cause under this
definition.
This provision and the next provision also recognize that suspicion
may be based on an algorithm or profile that produces a fifty percent
101
hit rate (a quantification of the preponderance standard). This
situation could arise, for instance, if the government can demonstrate,
using crime-mapping data, a more-likely-than-not probability that a
crime will occur in a particular, well-circumscribed area during the
102
period of the authorization.
The definition of “warrant” tracks the Fourth Amendment’s
language, adjusted for the surveillance context. The thirty-day
limitation is analogous to the durational limitation imposed on
103
electronic surveillance warrants.
It ensures that prolonged
surveillance will be supported by periodically renewed individualized
or statistical justification.

927 n.62 (2009) (“A 1982 survey of 166 federal judges asked their view of the numeric
equivalent of probable cause and found a mean level of 45.8% and a median of 50%.”).
100. Cf. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1251 (2012) (Kagan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing, in a case where the majority held that a reasonable officer
could have believed there was probable cause to seize evidence of gang membership from the
Millenders’ home, that “[m]embership in even the worst gang does not violate California law”).
101. See, e.g., Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that, under the
preponderance standard, “the trier of fact rules for the plaintiff if it thinks the chance greater
than 0.5 that the plaintiff is in the right”).
102. Cf. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bemache, The “High-Crime Area” Question:
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion
Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1631–35 (2008) (discussing methods of defining a “high-crime
area” using data).
103. See Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5) (West 2012).
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(5) Reasonable suspicion: An articulable belief that a search will
more likely than not lead to evidence of wrongdoing. The
belief may be based on statistical analysis. Judicial
authorization for a search based on reasonable suspicion is
called a court order and must describe with particularity the
person or place targeted, the evidence sought, and, if
applicable, the duration of the search. A court order is valid
for 48 hours, at which point a new showing of reasonable
suspicion must be made.
Commentary: The Court has indicated that the reasonable
suspicion standard is more easily met than the probable cause
standard, but otherwise has provided little guidance beyond insisting
that the police have more than an “inchoate or unparticularized
104
suspicion or ‘hunch.’”
The present definition more precisely
communicates that reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than
probable cause by referring to an action’s capacity to “lead” to
evidence (rather than produce “significant” evidence), which is often
the goal of surveillance. For instance, in In re Application of the United
105
States, the court held that a warrant could not issue merely to obtain
location data about an individual suspected of crime, because location
106
is not “evidence of a crime.” However, under the standard in this
provision, if the government can show that it has probable cause to
arrest the individual, discovery of his location would more likely than
not lead to evidence that will help prove wrongdoing, i.e., it will lead
to discovery of the suspect, and thus reasonable suspicion would exist.
Given the language of the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must be
based on probable cause. However, the Supreme Court has suggested
that courts are able to issue orders authorizing searches or seizures on
107
less than probable cause. Current statutes, such as the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act, also authorize court orders based on
108
varying levels of justification. This provision similarly authorizes
104. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
105. No. 10-2188-SKG, 2011 WL 3423370 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2011).
106. Id. at *7 (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence [does not] sanction[] access to location
data on the basis of an arrest warrant alone . . . where there is no evidence of flight to avoid
prosecution and the requested information does not otherwise constitute evidence of crime.”).
107. Cf. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment might
permit the judiciary to authorize the seizure of a person on less than probable cause . . . .”);
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 n.5 (1984) (referencing this possibility with respect to
tracking inside a home).
108. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (West 2012) (authorizing access to account logs and e-mail
addresses, etc. if a court finds “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
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court orders based on reasonable suspicion. The forty-eight-hour
limitation on the validity of a court order is necessary given the
provisions on targeted searches in Part II.
(6) Exigent circumstances: (a) Circumstances that augur a serious
and specific danger, in which case a search is permitted if a
reasonable law enforcement officer would believe it is
necessary to help avert the perceived danger; or (b)
circumstances involving imminent danger or disappearance of
evidence that make obtaining a warrant or court order in a
timely manner difficult, in which case only probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, as the case may be, is required prior to
the search.
Commentary: Subsection (a) implements the danger exception
109
discussed earlier. It is meant to encompass national security crises
and other significant emergencies, imminent or not. Subsection (b) is
a standard definition of exigency focused on whether there is time to
110
get an order. Subsection (a) is the only bow to Justice Alito’s
suggestion in Jones that investigative techniques normally governed
by the Fourth Amendment should not be subject to constitutional
111
regulation when used to investigate “extraordinary offenses.”
Otherwise, this definition of exigent circumstances does not relax
restrictions on searches based on the nature of the offense. This stance
is based on the assumption that a search for evidence of an alreadycommitted crime does not merit less regulation simply because the
112
crime is a serious one.

grounds to believe that . . . the records or other information sought are relevant and material to
an ongoing criminal investigation”).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 77–78.
110. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (indicating that the “correct standard”
for gauging exigency justifying a warrantless intrusion is whether there is “hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or
the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling” (citation
omitted) (quoting State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn. 1989))).
111. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
112. For a lengthier argument, see generally Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime Severity
Analysis is Not Reasonable, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1 (2012).
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PART II: Regulation
(1) Targeted Public Searches
(a) A targeted public search that lasts longer than 48
hours in aggregate requires probable cause, and a
warrant unless exigent circumstances exist.
(b) A targeted public search that lasts longer than 20
minutes in aggregate but no longer than 48 hours in
aggregate requires reasonable suspicion, and a court
order unless exigent circumstances exist.
(c) A targeted public search that does not last longer than
20 minutes in aggregate may occur at a law
enforcement officer’s discretion whenever the officer
believes in good faith that the search can accomplish a
legitimate law enforcement objective.
Commentary: The concurring opinions in Jones suggest that
mosaic theory is in play when the government targets an individual. If
so, some method of measuring the intrusiveness of aggregated
information is necessary. But neither Justice Sotomayor nor Justice
Alito attempt to explain how that theory might be implemented.
Doing so requires addressing a number of complicated issues.
Professor Orin Kerr, who is not a fan of mosaic theory, has compiled a
list of these issues, which includes: (1) What test determines when a
mosaic has been created? (2) How should non-continuous
surveillance be analyzed? (3) What surveillance techniques are
governed by mosaic theory? (4) What level of justification is required
113
to carry out a mosaic search? Professor Kerr believes that these
questions are “difficult and novel” and counsel against adopting
114
mosaic theory.
These questions are difficult and novel. But this provision, in
combination with the definitions already provided, does a passable
job of answering them. Its implementation of mosaic theory is based
on application of the proportionality principle’s stipulation that the
justification for a search be roughly proportional to its intrusiveness.
Taking a cue from Justice Alito’s use of the word “prolonged” to

113. See Kerr, supra note 16 (manuscript at 19–20).
114. Id. (manuscript at 3).
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describe the types of tracking he might consider a search, the
provision’s restrictions do not depend on the type of technique at
issue but rather rely on time as the relevant metric for determining
intrusiveness. The provision draws the probable cause line at fortyeight hours, the length of time the government may hold an arrestee
116
before a judge must be consulted. It draws the reasonable suspicion
line at twenty minutes, the outer limits of a permissible length of a
117
street stop. Targeted public searches that last less than twenty
minutes must still be justified, but need only be in pursuit of any
118
“legitimate law enforcement objective.” Breaks in surveillance do
119
not “restart the mosaic clock,” but are aggregated to determine
whether the twenty-minute or forty-eight-hour threshold is met.
Note that this provision does not require as much justification as
would be required for physical seizures of equivalent duration. A
seizure that goes beyond twenty minutes usually becomes the
functional equivalent of an arrest and thus requires probable cause,
and a confrontation of less than twenty minutes that is nonetheless
120
considered a seizure requires reasonable suspicion. The assumption
here, however, is that physical detentions are more intrusive than
121
“virtual searches” of the type addressed in this provision. Thus,
under proportionality reasoning, the justification required is ratcheted
downward.

115. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
116. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (“[A] jurisdiction that
provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general
matter, comply with the promptness requirement of [the Fourth Amendment].”).
117. Cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687–88 (1985) (finding a twenty-minute stop
reasonable when the suspect was responsible for some of the delay); see also AM. LAW INST.,
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1) (1975) (permitting stops of up to
twenty minutes).
118. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS GOVERNING TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED
PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE Std. 2-9.2 (2012) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS ON PHYSICAL
SURVEILLANCE],
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_
justice_section_archive/crimjust_
standards_taps_blk.html
(defining
“legitimate
law
enforcement objective” as “detection, investigation, deterrence or prevention of crime, or
apprehension and prosecution of a suspected criminal”).
119. Kerr, supra note 16 (manuscript at 24).
120. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687–88; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (stating that
“an investigative detention [on less than probable cause] must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop” and holding a fifteen-minute detention
in a small room to be the functional equivalent of arrest).
121. I have used the term “virtual searches” to refer to searches that do not require physical
intrusion. See Slobogin, supra note 30, at 12.
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Other approaches to regulation of physical surveillance in public
have been proposed, but they face very significant administrability
problems. For instance, Professor Susan Freiwald has answered the
search question in terms of the extent to which the surveillance is
122
hidden, intrusive, continuous, and indiscriminate. While figuring out
whether a police action is hidden or indiscriminate is relatively simple,
the intrusiveness inquiry, as Professor Freiwald admits, “requires a
judgment about levels of intrusiveness” and an assessment of “the
123
richness of the information acquired.” She also provides no useful
124
definition of “continuous.” Much more elaboration is needed if
police and courts are to have any idea whether a particular
investigative action is regulated. A similar comment can be made
about a proposal from Mark Blitz that would regulate surveillance
“that has the capacity to systematically track, or otherwise collect
private information about [an] individual’s movements or other
activities in ways that go meaningfully beyond the surveillance that is
125
possible with unaided observation.”
This definition leaves
unanswered what “private information” is and when surveillance goes
“meaningfully beyond” unaided observation (which in any event, as
noted below, can be at least as intrusive as technologically-aided
observation).
Rules based on duration are easier to understand and abide by.
While precise time divisions such as those used in this provision are
arbitrary in the sense that they apply regardless of how intrusive the
search actually is, time limitations as a method of defining
constitutional protections have a solid pedigree. The forty-eight-hour
period that defines when an arrestee must be taken to a magistrate,
referenced above, is one example. While the Supreme Court has not
been as rigid about when a stop becomes an arrest, its case law on the
126
subject also leans heavily on the durational element. A third

122. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 3, ¶ 50 (2007), available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/freiwald-first-principles.pdf.
123. Id. at ¶¶ 64–65.
124. See id. at ¶¶ 69–70 (discussing continuous investigations and suggesting that tapping an
individual’s e-mail communications for three months is clearly continuous).
125. Mark Blitz, United States v. Jones—and the Forms of Surveillance that May Be Left
Unregulated in a Free Society, USVJONES.COM (June 4, 2012), http://usvjones.com/
2012/06/04/united-states-v-jones-and-the-forms-of-surveillance-that-may-be-left-unregulated-ina-free-society.
126. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 224 (1984) (finding that no seizure occurred where
the confrontation lasted less than five minutes, and pointing out that the secondary checkpoints
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S 543 (1976), where the Court held that a seizure had
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example of a time-limited constitutional rule, from outside the search
and seizure context, is the Court’s holding that two weeks marks the
point at which police may reinitiate interrogation of a suspect who
has asserted his right to counsel, even though the degree of coercion
experienced by suspects can vary significantly over time depending
127
upon a wide variety of circumstances. These types of prophylactic
standards are a well-established method of construing many of the
clauses in the Constitution, in recognition of the institutional
128
limitations on rulemaking. Congress has also relied on time periods
as a means of distinguishing regulatory thresholds in the surveillance
129
context.
Note three other aspects of the provision. First, this provision
applies to naked-eye observation as well as technologically-aided
surveillance. Overt surveillance by the police can be just as intrusive
130
as covert tracking or monitoring. Second, given the definition of
“targeted” search, this provision applies not only to observation of
suspicious people but also to targeted surveillance of places. Under
this provision, government would need at least reasonable suspicion
for targeted surveillance of a particular place that lasts longer than
twenty minutes and probable cause when such surveillance exceeds
forty-eight hours (with a new probable cause finding required after
thirty days). Third, no court order is required for short-term public
searches or when exigency exists. Thus, for instance, if an officer
legitimately stationed on a street corner observes suspicious activity
that, over a twenty-minute period, develops into reasonable suspicion
that requires the officer to follow the suspect, a court order would not
be necessary to continue the pursuit. Given the fast-moving nature of

occurred, lasted up to five minutes).
127. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (“14 days . . . provides plenty of
time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel,
and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.”).
128. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI L. REV. 190, 208
(1988) (“Under any plausible approach to constitutional interpretation, the courts must be
authorized—indeed, required—to consider their own, and the other branches’, limitations and
propensities when they construct doctrine to govern future cases.”).
129. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5) (West 2012)
(limiting electronic surveillance warrant to thirty days); id. at § 2703 (requiring a warrant for
acquiring information in electronic storage for less than 180 days and only a subpoena for access
to information in storage over 180 days).
130. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the
Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 277 (2002) (reporting a study in which participants
ranked overt police observation of a person on the street to be as “intrusive” as overt camera
surveillance and more intrusive than a fifteen-second roadblock stop).
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most street surveillance, the exigency exception would presumably
apply very frequently in this setting.
(2) Targeted Data Searches
(a) A targeted data search of data held by an institutional
third party that accumulates information about
activities or transactions that take place over more
than a 48-hour period requires probable cause, and a
warrant unless exigent circumstances exist.
(b) A targeted data search of data held by an institutional
third party that is not governed by (2)(a) requires
reasonable suspicion, and a court order unless exigent
circumstances exist.
Commentary: The commentary to Part II(1) explains the rationale
for the forty-eight-hour cut-off in this provision. Under this provision,
only reasonable suspicion would be required to obtain phone or
internet service provider logs detailing communications made by the
target at a particular point in time. But probable cause would be
required if the government sought data on calls made over more than
a two-day period, a monthly bank record or credit card statement, or
a medical record that describes symptom history.
Another approach to targeted data searches that would be
consistent with proportionality reasoning would be to focus on the
131
privacy interest associated with the type of record being accessed.
Under this scheme, accessing medical records might require probable
cause, whereas phone records might be accessible on something less.
Either regulatory scheme is somewhat arbitrary and over- and underinclusive in terms of accurately capturing relative intrusiveness. The
proposed provision is more pragmatic, however, for reasons similar to
those noted in connection with public searches. Differentiating the
relative privacy interest in the various types and subtypes of records
that law enforcement might seek (for instance, medical, bank, credit
card, travel, phone, utility, real estate records) is a difficult chore that
132
will inhibit the creation of clear rules. Furthermore, some records

131. This is the approach I took in PRIVACY AT RISK. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 180–
96.
132. For instance, the American Bar Association’s effort in this regard, in which I was
involved, resulted in provisions that create four different types of institutional third party
records (“highly private,” “moderately private,” “minimally private,” and “not private”)
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searches, such as those that occur in connection with data-mining,
might access more than one type of record, and investigators cannot
133
always know ahead of time the type of record they will be accessing.
This provision rejects the third party doctrine, but only if the third
party is an “institution” (a commercial enterprise or government
agency). Thus, this provision does not apply to efforts at obtaining
data from a non-institutional third party, such as a friend of the target.
In these situations, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
134
Amendment does not apply. Even though this type of data
acquisition would be a search under these provisions, the fact that a
person, as opposed to an impersonal entity, has an autonomy interest
in controlling information in his or her possession may require
135
different treatment than when the third party is an institution.
This provision is also inapposite when data is sought from the
target, whether the target is a person or an institution. In United States
136
v. Hubbell, the Supreme Court held that when the records are in the
possession of the person who is the focus of the investigation rather
than a third party, a subpoena forcing production of the records will
often be insufficient, and a warrant may be required for reasons
having to do with the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
137
Amendment. Further, because of this statute’s definition of “search”

depending on application of four criteria: (1) the extent to which the transfer of the information
to a third party “is necessary to participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or is socially
beneficial, including to freedom of speech and association;” (2) the extent to which the
information is “personal,” “likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed,” and otherwise
would not be revealed outside “one’s close social network;” (3) the extent to which the
information is accessible by persons other than the institutional third party; and (4) the extent to
which “existing law, including the law of privilege,” allows access to the information. AM. BAR
ASS’N, STANDARDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS Stds. 25-4.1,
25-4.2 (2012) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS ON THIRD PARTY RECORDS], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/policy/standards/law_enforcement_access.h
tml.
133. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 583–84
(2009) (noting that police “will necessarily collect information at the end of its dissemination,
whereas judgments as to whether and when privacy is likely must be made prospectively” and
“[a]s a result, the Fourth Amendment rules that the police must apply ex ante must hinge on
details of the history of information that they cannot know ex ante”).
134. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides
his wrongdoing will not reveal it”).
135. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 160 (“[E]ven if . . . one accepts the ‘social undercover
agent’ cases as valid law, they are distinguishable from the ‘institutional undercover agent’ cases
like Miller because social agents have an autonomy interest that institutional agents lack.”).
136. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
137. Id. at 44–45 (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires the government to show it
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(which speaks of obtaining information about a “person or place”),
this provision does not regulate data searches when the target is a
commercial enterprise or government agency. This situation is
138
governed by cases like United States v. Morton Salt Co., which hold
that when the focus of an investigation is a business entity, mere
139
“official curiosity” might be sufficient grounds for obtaining records.
This approach is consistent with proportionality reasoning if one
assumes that institutional entities have a much reduced privacy
140
interest.
(3) General Public and Data Searches
(a) Public or data searches that are general in nature must
be authorized by legislation or regulations issued
pursuant to such legislation and may focus on a
discrete group only if the group has meaningful access
to the legislative or administrative process.
(b) Rules governing access to, storage of, and analysis of
information obtained in a general search must apply
evenly or randomly to all members of the group, unless
the requirements of II(1) or (2) are met.
Commentary: This provision regulates searches that do not have a
specific person or place as a target, but rather are aimed at observing
or gathering information about large numbers of people, in the hope
that crime will be detected or deterred. Under the Supreme Court’s
third party doctrine, general public and data searches are not
governed by the Fourth Amendment unless a physical trespass is
141
somehow involved. If the Court were to hold that these types of
governmental actions were searches, it would probably turn to its
142
“special needs” analysis which, as noted above, would require

has “prior knowledge” of the “existence and authenticity” of the specific documents it seeks to
subpoena from the person who possesses the documents).
138. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
139. See id. at 652 (“Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as
caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless lawenforcing [sic] agencies have a
legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the
public interest.”).
140. See FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (“The protection in FOIA against
disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that it would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to corporations.”).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 27–30.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80.
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individualized suspicion if the “primary purpose” of the general
search is a “general interest in crime control,” but otherwise would
grant deference to the government’s program. As applied, outcomes
under this test are difficult to predict. Checkpoints to nab drunk
drivers or to detect illegal immigrants at some distance from the
143
border are permissible, but a roadblock set up to detect narcotics is
144
not; a drug testing program aimed at students in extracurricular
145
activities is permissible, but a drug testing program for pregnant
146
mothers is not.
This provision instead applies political process theory to general
147
searches. It imposes three requirements on general search programs.
First, they must be approved or authorized by a legislature. Many of
the Court’s special needs cases involve general searches implemented
148
by the executive branch, with no legislative input. Second, the group
affected by the general search must have meaningful access to the
legislative process. Admittedly, much rides on the word “meaningful.”
One measure of this concept, noted earlier, would be the extent to
which the general search will affect members of the legislature. As
Justice Jackson stated, “there is no more effective practical guaranty
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
149
must be imposed generally.” Third, consistent with this view, the
group search, both as authorized and as implemented, must affect
everyone within the group equally. If instead persons or places are
singled out, then the provisions regarding targeted searches are
triggered.

143. See generally Mich. Dep’t State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding a
sobriety checkpoint); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding a
roadblock to detect illegal immigrants sixty-six miles north of the border).
144. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37–38 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a
checkpoint set up to detect narcotics in vehicles, and trying to distinguish this holding from
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz).
145. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (upholding drug testing program for
students in extracurricular activities).
146. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79–80 (2001) (invalidating testing program
for pregnant mothers and trying to distinguish this holding from Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), which upheld a drug testing program for student athletes).
147. See generally Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General
Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93 (2007) (applying, for the first time,
political process theory to general searches).
148. See Slobogin, supra note 83, at 133–34 (describing the Court’s special needs cases).
149. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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Thus, for instance, a drone or camera surveillance system would be
permissible under this provision only if the relevant municipal
government approved it and the system covered the entire
municipality or rotated its focus on a random or neutral basis. If
instead the drones or cameras were programmed to monitor
particular areas, reasonable suspicion or probable cause, depending
upon the length of the surveillance, would be required. Rather than
“individualized suspicion,” the justification in such cases could be
based on statistical analysis of crime within the area. As another
example, a data-mining program run by the federal government that
will access monthly records would have to be authorized by Congress
and would need to apply to the entire country unless algorithms can
produce, within a subset of targets, evidence of crime against fifty
150
percent of that subset during the time of the warrant.
V. OTHER POSSIBLE PROVISIONS
A statute or regulation that comprehensively regulates public and
data searches would also contain provisions covering a number of
other important issues. These provisions would deal with post-search
implementation matters such as whether and when notice of the
search is required, how long and under what conditions information
obtained during the search may be maintained, and the circumstances
under which this information may be disclosed. Provisions must also
address accountability issues, including remedies. The following
discussion briefly comments on these two general categories, relying
in large part on work done by the American Bar Association’s
Criminal Justice Section.
A. Post-Search Regulation
In the traditional search case, the target knows that a search of his
or her house, person, papers, or effects has occurred. Where searches
are covert—often the case when government uses technology—notice
151
of a more formal nature might be constitutionally required. In any
event, notice is a useful way of ensuring accountability because
officials will know that their targets will eventually find out about the
surveillance. Thus, the ABA Standards on Law Enforcement Access to

150. For further elaboration, see Slobogin, supra note 83, at 138–41.
151. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) (suggesting that post-surveillance
notice is constitutionally required in the electronic surveillance context).
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Third Party Records require notice to the target of a records search
within thirty days of its occurrence unless the records are only
152
“minimally protected.” The notice can be delayed if harm to public
safety or the investigation would result, but may only be dispensed
with entirely “where it would be unduly burdensome given the
number of persons who must otherwise be notified, taking into
consideration, however, that the greater number of persons indicates
153
a greater intrusion into privacy.”
The Supreme Court has suggested, without deciding, that the Due
Process Clause requires law enforcement to keep a tight rein on
154
information it accumulates. The information obtained through
public and data searches can be voluminous and highly personal, so
the duty to prevent leaks, hacking, and dissemination to inappropriate
persons is particularly strong in this context. The ABA’s Standards on
Third Party Records contain a number of provisions governing these
matters. For instance, the standards require that records be kept
155
“reasonably secure from unauthorized access,” that all attempted
and successful access to records that are moderately or highly
156
protected be subject to audit, and that records be “destroyed
157
according to an established schedule.” An example of this type of
schedule in the physical surveillance setting comes from Washington,
D.C., where footage from surveillance cameras is destroyed after ten
158
days unless needed for evidence or training purposes.
The ABA’s standards also impose limitations on the disclosure of
information obtained in data searches. In essence, the standards state
that disclosure may occur only in connection with criminal
159
investigation and training or if necessary to protect the public.
160
Other disclosures must be specifically authorized by law.
152. ABA STANDARDS ON THIRD PARTY RECORDS, supra note 132, Std. 25-5.7(a).
153. Id. Std. 25-5.7(f).
154. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (“The right to collect and use . . . data for
public purposes . . . in some circumstances . . . arguably has its roots in the Constitution . . . .”).
155. ABA STANDARDS ON THIRD PARTY RECORDS, supra note 132, Std. 25-6.1(a)(i).
156. Id. Std. 25-6.1(b)(i).
157. Id. Std. 25-6.1(b)(ii).
158. NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., EVALUATING THE USE OF PUBLIC
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION 76 (2011), available at
http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412403-Evaluating-the-Use-of-Public-SurveillanceCameras-for-Crime-Control-and-Prevention.pdf.
159. ABA STANDARDS ON THIRD PARTY RECORDS, supra note 132, Std. 25-6.2.
160. Id. Std. 25-6.2(e). Some have argued that, if these types of disclosure rules exist, rules
limiting access to information are not necessary. E.g., William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the
Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2183–84 (2002). I take issue with that conclusion in SLOBOGIN,
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B. Accountability
Accountability can be accomplished through a number of
mechanisms. Already noted is the role notice and auditing can play.
The ABA Standards on Technologically-Assisted Physical
Surveillance also require the creation of “administrative rules which
161
ensure that the information necessary for . . . accountability exists.”
162
In short, some method of “watching the watchers” should be
established. As another means of controlling discretion, the standards
require that law enforcement agencies conduct “periodic review . . . of
the scope and effectiveness of technologically-assisted physical
surveillance” and that the agencies “[m]aintain[] and [make] available
to the public general information about the type or types of
163
surveillance being used and the frequency of their use.”
As to sanctions that might be imposed for violation of the rules,
administrative punishment, damages, injunctions, and criminal
prosecution can all be on the table, in addition to the traditional
Fourth Amendment remedy of exclusion. I have expressed a
preference for a damages action over exclusion even in the traditional
164
search context. Some sort of alternative to exclusion—a remedy that
applies only in criminal cases—is even more important where
technology allows government to access information about thousands
of innocent people who will never have the option of invoking the
165
rule. Furthermore, the exclusion remedy is a poor fit for violation of

supra note 54, at 13–32, 199–201.
161. ABA STANDARDS ON PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note 118, Std. 2-9.1(f)(i).
162. DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 334 (1998) (arguing that the only way for people
to confront governmental surveillance efforts is to watch those watching them).
163. ABA STANDARDS ON PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE, supra note 118, Stds. 2-9.1(f)(iv),
(v).
164. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary
Rule, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 363 (discussing a damages alternative to exclusion). However, I have
also argued that, as a method of deterring pretextual use of general public and data searches,
evidence found during such a search that is not related to its purpose (e.g., cocaine found during
a terrorist-prevention surveillance program) could be excluded. Slobogin, supra note 83, at 142–
43.
165. Another issue not addressed by the proposed statute is standing to challenge a public
or data search. See Kerr, supra note 16 (manuscript at 33–34) (arguing that because mosaic
searches might affect many people to different degrees, determining who has standing will be
“difficult”). Under the Court’s current jurisprudence, only the person whose own privacy
interests have been intruded upon has standing. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)
(stating that Fourth Amendment standing depends upon whether the individual has a
“legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place”). Under that standing rule for invoking
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post-search rules, like those dealing with notice and dissemination,
166
that do not involve illegal access to excludable information.
VI. CONCLUSION
The statute proposed in this article attempts to implement mosaic
theory through application of two frames for thinking about the
Fourth Amendment: the proportionality principle and political
process theory. It answers the four questions left open after Jones as
follows:
1. Differentiating between short-term and long-term physical
surveillance can be justified under proportionality analysis,
and clear, if somewhat arbitrary, distinctions based on the
duration of the surveillance can be established.
2. Physical surveillance (including, but not limited to,
tracking) should not always require probable cause.
Proportionality analysis suggests that reasonable suspicion
or an even lower standard is an adequate justification for
government actions that are only moderately or minimally
intrusive.
3. The nature of the offense should normally not affect the
justification required by proportionality reasoning. The
one exception occurs when a search is necessary to
prevent a serious, specific threat.
4. Proportionality reasoning should also apply when
government engages in institutional data searches. The
third party doctrine should be discarded in this situation;
instead, justification should be required for data access, but
should vary depending upon the length of time over which
the sought-after transactions occurred.
The statute also addresses a number of questions not raised in
Jones. It redefines search for Fourth Amendment purposes to

exclusion or seeking damages, in practical effect there would be no remedy for public and data
searches of third parties. The preferable standing rule, arguably required when the goal of a
constitutional rule is deterrence, is target or universal standing. See Arnold Loewy, PoliceObtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence
from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907, 939 (1989) (“[W]hen obtaining
evidence is the constitutional wrong, [the proposed remedy] should be subjected to a
cost/benefit analysis. If allowing third-party standing would deter the objectionable practice,
such standing should be permitted.”).
166. SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 133–34.
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conform to its lay meaning. It defines probable cause and reasonable
suspicion more definitively than the case law does by providing that
probable cause searches must be likely to obtain significant evidence
of wrongdoing, while permitting reasonable suspicion searches that
are likely to discover leads to such evidence. It also introduces the
idea that general searches—searches of groups in the absence of
suspicion—should be regulated differently than targeted searches,
through reliance on political process theory.
As important as the content of these proposals is the method of
explicating them. Construction of statutes regulating government
investigation is crucial for a number of reasons. First, implementation
of Fourth Amendment theory through statutory provisions requires
confrontation with the implications of that theory. Until theoreticians
are forced to put their prescriptions into action, the logic and
feasibility of their proposals cannot be fully evaluated. Second, by
providing a template for legislatures, a statutory proposal increases
the probability that legislatures will get involved in the process of
regulating searches, which itself has several advantages. As Justice
Alito suggested in Jones, legislatures are better equipped than courts,
bound as they are by the case and controversy requirement and
judicial restraint, to provide detailed and comprehensive regulations
167
about a wide range of scenarios. And courts can do a much more
competent job evaluating the constitutionality of a given practice if a
168
statute provides them with the framework in which it occurs. For
instance, courts might think quite differently about justification
requirements if they know that the government is constrained by
rules governing notice, disclosure, and accountability.
Another possible advantage that legislation has over judicial
analysis, also raised by Justice Alito, is that legislatures can be more

167. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“A
legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”); see also Craig M. Bradley,
Criminal Procedure in the “Land of Oz”: Lessons for America, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
99, 129 (1990) (“Since Supreme Court rulemaking is limited by the Court’s docket, the facts of
the cases before it, and its frequent unwillingness to ‘mandate a code of behavior for state
officials,’ the result is patchwork of rules that cover some, but ignore equally important aspects
of criminal procedure.” (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986))).
168. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in
Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 791 (1970) (Without a statute, “[t]he Court cannot know
whether the conduct before it is . . . unconnected or connected with a set of other practices
or . . . the comprehensive shape of the set of practices involved, . . . their relations, their
justifications, their consequences.”).
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responsive than courts to changes in the technology used to carry out
169
searches. If the proposed statute is adopted, however, this advantage
would be muted, because regulation would not be driven by the
method of investigation. A search would occur whenever government
is looking for evidence of wrongdoing, regardless of how it does so,
and justification levels would be set according to the duration of the
search, not the type of technology used or the type of information
sought. This approach is not only consistent with the Fourth
Amendment’s language and history, but should be able to
accommodate even significant changes in the way government
chooses to investigate its citizens.

169. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances involving
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”); see
also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004) (“Technological change may reveal the
institutional limits of the modern enterprise of constitutional criminal procedure, exposing the
need for statutory guidance when technology is changing rapidly.”).

